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Abstract
Common observations of the unpredictability of human behavior and
the influence of one question on the answer to another suggest social sci-
ence experiments are probabilistic and may be mutually incompatible with
one another, characteristics attributed to quantum mechanics (as distin-
guished from classical mechanics). This paper examines this superficial
similarity in depth using the Foulis-Randall Operational Statistics lan-
guage. In contradistinction to physics, social science deals with complex,
open systems for which the set of possible experiments is unknowable and
outcome interference is a graded phenomenon resulting from the ways the
human brain processes information. It is concluded that social science
is, in some ways, “less classical” than quantum mechanics, but that gen-
eralized “quantum” structures may provide appropriate descriptions of
social science experiments. Specific challenges to extending “quantum”
structures to social science are identified.
1 Introduction
Human beings are much bigger than electrons, and much more complex. Hu-
mans do not change their states by small, discrete amounts. And even though
human beings themselves come in discrete packages, their behavior typically
does not, at least at the level of analysis used in social science. All of this sug-
gests that descriptions of elementary particles and descriptions of elementary
school children are likely to be quite different. I am not therefore suggesting
that the same phenomena occur in both, and yet, the roll of a die and proteins
crossing a cell membrane are also quite dissimilar, but the language of ordi-
nary statistics can successfully describe certain aspects of both. In this article
∗This article is based on a presentation at the Biennial Meeting of the International Quan-
tum Structures Association, Vienna, Austria, July 2-8, 2002. I gratefully acknowledge helpful
comments on a draft of this paper from Charles Brainerd and David Foulis.
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I examine ways in which social science may require generalized statistical un-
derstandings akin to understandings necessitated in physics by the advent of
quantum mechanics, as well as ways such social science generalizations may be
different from those in quantum mechanics.
I offer the perspectives presented here as a practicing social scientist: I have
doctorates in both medicine and psychology; I currently work in a department
of psychiatry and have spent a number of years in departments of psychology,
sociology and communication. I proffer these thoughts in the context of my
previous work in quantum logic and Operational Statistics [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
One important goal is to suggest possible directions for development, if social
sciences are to be encompassed by “quantum” structures.
In order to highlight the parallels and contrasts between quantum mechanics
and social science I take specific and simplifiedversions of each. As representative
of quantum mechanics I take experiments on spin-one particles, wherein states
are unit vectors in the complex Hilbert space C3 and observables are Hermitian
operators on that Hilbert space. Obviously, this does not characterize all of
“quantum logic” or “quantum structures” and, indeed, I argue that “quantum”
structures go beyond physics and provide, or at least suggest, the requisites
for understanding social science. This is particularly true of the Foulis-Randall
Operational Statistics formulation, which I use in much of what follows.
For present purposes, I take social science to mean the study of human
behavior. As an illustrative example of social science, I use studies of individual
human beings in experimental situations as might occur in cognitive psychology,
with basic experiments on memory providing specifics. I have tried to describe
below enough of the theory and operationalization of the memory experiments
to make the comparison clear, but I have simplified both the theory and the
data somewhat in this presentation.
The outline of the paper is as follows: First I sketch reasons one might ex-
pect similarities or differences between quantum mechanics and social sciences.
Then, to facilitate comparison with social science, I describe the Hilbert space
manual of experiments on spin-one particles in the language of Foulis-Randall
Operational Statistics. I then review the theory and operationalization of mem-
ory experiments in which subjects learn lists of words from common categories
(e.g., fruits or animals), describing these also in the Foulis-Randall language.
Based on these expositions, I suggest ways in which social science is similar to
and different from quantum mechanics at the level of mathematical and statis-
tical description. Finally, I outline what would be needed to extend “quantum”
structures to social science.
1.1 Superficial similarities and differences
A facile—and I think specious—argument for differences between physics and
social science is that the former is an exact science while the latter is inexact.
Physics is exact in that it can predict the outcome of certain experiments with
great accuracy [but compare 7]. Consider, however, what happens if I drop a
feather. While the influences on the feather’s descent—gravity, rigidity and mass
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of the feather, air flow, air temperature, initial linear and angular momentum,
distance to the floor, etc.—are all physical concepts, no one can, in reality,
predict exactly where the feather will fall. Some might object that we could
in principle do this if we made all of the appropriate measures, but we cannot
make all these measurements for real feathers in real rooms. Yet we frequently
hold social science to the task of predicting how a particular human being—a
vastly more complex system than a feather in a room—will behave in a certain
situation. This fundamental difference—the complexity of the phenomena to be
described and predicted—between physical and social science is an underpinning
of much of what follows here. The task of learning words on a list is a very simple
task, yet it confronts us with many complications. Certain very low-level tasks
such as reaction times in attentional tasks might be simpler (but maybe not)
and most tasks of psychology are vastly more complex than memory for word
lists.
Nevertheless, there are also many reasons to believe that social science might
behave in a “non-classical” way. A key aspect of quantum mechanics is incom-
patible measurements. In social science, asking one question of a human being
can change the state of the organism so that the answers to other questions
are altered. This could happen for external reasons (e.g., so as to not appear
inconsistent to the questioner) or for internal reasons (e.g., one question might
make certain things more, or less, accessible in memory).
Incompatible measurements occur with spin-one particles when spin com-
ponents are measured along axes, say, 45 degrees apart, if the first measurement
[8, p.72: “measurements of the first kind”] puts the system in an eigenstate of
the measurement operator. It may not be entirely dissimilar if a person facing
an emotional situation is first asked “Do you feel angry?” Answering “Yes” may
take the person from a blended emotional state to an experience of anger, lead-
ing to both another “Yes” answer if asked again (say, by someone else) and to
changes in the responses to questions about fear or sadness, a “collapsing of the
emotion wave,” if you will.
And both situations may also be inherently probabilistic: Before the first
question, it may be neither true nor false that the person is angry; they may be
feeling a jumble of things that can get conceptualized as anger or as something
else. This would seem, at least in some cases, to go beyond a “mixed state”
consisting of 40% anger, plus 35% fear, plus.... There could also be an incom-
patibility in emotional states, so that the more certain one is of being angry,
the less certain one is of being afraid, resulting in an “uncertainty principle for
emotions.”
With this sense that there are certain “intriguing parallels” between quan-
tum mechanical phenomena and social science phenomena, and yet important
differences, let us begin an in-depth comparison of specific examples, starting
with a common language. An ultimate question is whether Nature takes advan-
tage of the incompatibilities in social science operations and produces results,
as quantum mechanics does, that are inconsistent with ordinary statistics.
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1.2 The Foulis-Randall Descriptive Language
Foulis and Randall’s Operational Statistics [e.g., 9, 10, 11] is a generalization of
the Kolmogorov [12, 13] description of an experiment consisting of a set X of
possible outcomes and a σ-field of subsets of X identified as observable events;
probability measures on this σ-field are states of the system.
In the Foulis-Randall generalization, a set of experiments, or “operations,”
is considered together and thought of as the manual or handbook containing
descriptions of all of the operations that can be performed on the system under
consideration. Each operation is represented by its set of outcomes, so a manual
is a set of sets. These sets overlap if one outcome can occur in two distinct
experiments. Any subset of an operation is considered an observable event.
Events are orthogonal if they operationally reject one another, that is, if they
are disjoint and their union is an event. A probability measure, or weight
function, ω for a manual is a mapping of outcomes into [0, 1] with an unordered
sum of 1 over any operation; the set of all such weight functions is Ω, the weight
space for the manual. An operational proposition for a manual is defined via
the set of outcomes that confirm the proposition and the set of outcomes that
refute the proposition. Taken together, these ordered pairs of outcomes form
the logic Π for the manual. Under favorable conditions Π is an orthomodular
poset. The probability measures on the logic are called states.
2 A Quantum Mechanics Example: Spin-One
Experiments
Measurements on a spin-one particle correspond to Hermitian operators on C3
and can be carried out using a generalized Stern-Gerlach procedure [5]. The
outcomes of the corresponding operation are the eigenspaces of the Hermitian
operator, which are mutually orthogonal and span the space. Hence, the manual
of operations can be taken to be all maximal orthogonal sets of subspaces of
C
3, or equivalently, all maximal orthogonal sets of projections on C3 [cf. 14,
Examples 12, 13]. Real physical measurements are presumed to correspond
approximately to these theoretical measurements. Events are orthogonal sets
of projections and two events are orthogonal as events exactly when they are
orthogonal as sets of projections. A weight function on the manual is a measure
on the projection lattice and hence by Gleason’s Theorem [15] corresponds to a
density operator on C3.
The logic of the spin-one manual is isomorphic to the projection lattice
on C3: Outcomes that confirm the proposition corresponding to projection P
are projections less than or equal to P ; outcomes that refute the proposition
are projections orthogonal to P . States on the logic are equivalent to weight
functions on the manual and therefore to density operators. Note that the
physical states go beyond the states on the logic in that they contain phase
information. States differing only in their phase information correspond to the
same weight function on the manual, though they differ in the effect they have
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in compound operations [3].
One potentially confusing aspect of the Hilbert space manual described
here is the multiple roles played by the same mathematical object. Indeed, a
projection onto a one dimensional subspace plays four distinct roles: (1) it is
an outcome, (2) it is a proposition, (3) it is a state or weight, and (4) it is an
observable. The danger here is that, for example, a superposition of states is
mathematically equivalent to a superposition of outcomes, propositions, etc.
3 A Social Science Example: Memory Experi-
ments
3.1 Memory Experiments as Social Science
The study of human memory is a typical social science, and the study of basic
memory processes via experiments on learning word lists would seem an uncom-
plicated example. Yet the complexities are quite marked on both the theoretical
and applied sides.
Common sense suggests that events are remembered by storing a memory
trace in the brain and some memories are stronger than others. The “strength of
the memory trace” should predict memory performance. Research suggests that
this simple and intuitively appealing “theory” is inadequate. In particular, data
on false memories—remembering things that did not happen, say, remembering
that you sent a letter when you only “wrote it in your head” or remembering
false lyrics to a song—suggest the need for a more complex theory of memory.
One such theory is Fuzzy Trace Theory, which asserts that people remem-
ber things about the verbatim details of a situation stored in a verbatim trace,
but that they also abstract the overall gist or meaning of the situation and sep-
arately, and independently, store this gist or fuzzy trace; subsequent memory
performance is based on both traces [16, 17; summarized in 18]. The verbatim
trace has been found to fade more quickly than the gist trace, so after a time,
the exact words spoken might be forgotten, but the meaning of what was said
remains: The initial statement “I was a math major in college” might be remem-
bered as “I studied math in college” but not “I learned hair styling in beauty
school.” In the type of memory experiment discussed below, subjects study a
list of words from specific categories. For example, they might study HORSE,
COW, DOG, APPLE, BANANA, PEAR. The verbatim trace would be exactly
this list of six words. The abstracted gist might be “animals and fruits.” If a
subject remembers CAT or ORANGE, these are gist-consistent, verbatim-false
memories.
As in physics, there are controversies, subtleties and complexities that this
portrayal ignores, but it suffices to exemplify a social science research paradigm.
It is not important whether Fuzzy Trace Theory is correct or even plausible:
It represents a typical social science theory, and its ultimate fate depends on
empirical support; assessing whether the data support it requires an adequate
statistical description such as the one provided below.
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3.2 Recall, Recognition and the Fuzzy Trace Covert Judg-
ments
Memory tasks can be crudely divided into two types: Those that ask you
to recognize as a valid or invalid memory something that is proposed to you
(Think: Multiple-choice test), and those that ask you to recall specific informa-
tion (Think: Fill-in-the-blank test). Both types of tasks can be and have been
used to study memory, and a viable memory theory must explain both. In what
follows I focus on recognition, because it is conceptually and experimentally
simpler. Continuing the above word list example, a recognition test of memory
might ask subjects to respond Yes (i.e., “It was on the list.”) or No (i.e., “It
was not on the list.”) to each of the following probe words: HORSE, ORANGE,
FLUTE, CAT, HAMMER, PEAR. In this test list HORSE and PEAR are tar-
gets, that is, words that were, in fact, on the list. The remaining four words
are distractors: CAT and ORANGE are related distractors, while FLUTE and
HAMMER are unrelated distractors. (Note that actual study and test lists are
usually much longer than this—scores to hundreds of such words from perhaps
6 to 20 categories.)
Fuzzy Trace Theory holds that, when a word is presented as a probe on a
recognition test, covert judgments are made about the probe based on stored
verbatim and gist traces, and these covert judgments determine overt behavior,
that is, whether the probe is classified as a target, a related distractor or an un-
related distractor. An identity judgment is made if a sufficiently strong verbatim
trace of a studied target matches the probe. A similarity judgment is made if a
sufficiently strong gist trace of studied targets matches the probe. A nonidentity
judgment is made when, based on verbatim information, a probe can be ruled
out as a target: If the probe ORANGE called into memory all three of the fruits
on the list, then ORANGE could be eliminated as a target. The likelihood of
these covert judgments differs for different probe types. If both verbatim and
gist traces are strong, identity and similarity judgments would likely be made
for targets, and similarity and nonidentity judgments would likely be made for
related distractors; for unrelated distractors none of these judgments is likely.
3.3 The Theoretical Memory Manual
“Systems are prepared” by having subjects listen to the words on the study
list. Characteristics of such systems can be examined using various operations.
Of interest for the moment are operations asking subjects to identify probes as
targets (T ), related distractors (R) or unrelated distractors (U). Each operation
has three possible outcomes and the frequencies of these under various conditions
are studied. The prototypic operation is thus represented by the TRU triangle
shown in Figure 1. There is a different such operation for each probe type. Hence
the manual for the experiments is {{TT , RT , UT }, {TR, RR, UR}, {TU , RU , UU}}
where RT is understood to be the outcome of the subject’s saying the probe
was a related distractor when in fact it was a target, etc.
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Figure 1: The TRU Triangle
Already we are faced with a complication not faced by physics. If a physical
system is prepared and electrons are bounced off the system to try to determine
its properties, each of the electrons is identical. (Charley Randall: “Electrons
don’t have first names.”) In the case of memory experiments, however, various
related distractors are not identical. Indeed, asking about ORANGE vs. PER-
SIMMON will likely produce very different responses, even though both are
fruits. Furthermore, not all targets are alike either: Although we speak of the
“probability of an identity judgment for a target probe,” this probability differs
from target to target, depending, for example, on where the target occurred in
the study list and the memorability of the target itself.
To complicate matters further, the preparations are “expensive” in the sense
that some human must sit and study the words to be learned, then respond to
the test. The supply of people willing to do such things is often limited to the
size of a Psychology 101 class for a given semester. In light of this, each “system”
(i.e., subject) is tested with multiple probes, therefore, the actual experiment
is a compound experiment. Past research has shown that each probe disturbs
the system, so that the system is in a slightly different state after each probe.
Although these perturbations are occasionally themselves of interest, more often
they are nuisances that are statistically averaged out, say, by randomizing the
order of the probes for different subjects, then collapsing responses within probe
type.
After collapsing, the manual for the experiment consists once again of three
trichotomies {{TT , RT , UT }, {TR, RR, UR}, {TU , RU , UU}}, where RT is now
understood to be an idealized outcome whose frequency is the proportion of
times the subject said a target was a related distractor.
This idealized memory manual that is used in what follows, but it is impor-
tant to consider its arbitrary nature. If related distractors came in two varieties,
highly related (CAT, ORANGE) and somewhat related (SKUNK, CORN), there
would be four probe types, hence four TRU triangles, in the manual (or four
TRhrRsrU rectangles, if subjects are to make this discrimination). Since every
possible probe is different from every other, there are as many possible probe
types as there are words (and non-words are used in some variants), hence the
possible number of operations that could be carried out on a preparation is large
and unknown (and varies with time, plus depends on the language spoken by
the participant). Moreover, the number of outcomes could be three or four or
more, in contrast to the spin-one manual where all (maximal) operations have
three outcomes (and to continua in physics where any subdivision is possible,
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whereas for memory research the ability to discriminate breaks down if levels of
relatedness are too close).
And worse yet, experiments are always carried out on “mixed beams,” since
not all “preparations” are in the same state: Some participants “zoned out” as
certain words were read; some may not know some words (we try to avoid
this generally); some may not pay attention to the response instructions; some
may have emotional reactions to some fruits—i.e., like or dislike them—and
hence respond in an idiosyncratic way; or some words may be more accessible
because they were used more recently. Changing one word on the study list,
or the order of the words, means the preparation is different. We can do the
same “counterbalancing” act as for test lists, but again there are very large
number of preparations and the relationship between two preparations is likely
to be ordinal (B is between A and C) rather than metric (A differs from B
by x units on some scale). Furthermore, different subjects abstract—and hence
remember—different gists (say, “animals” vs. “domestic animals” or “fruits”
vs. “edible plants”).
3.4 The Coarsened Memory Manual
For technical and historical reasons, recognition experiments are typically car-
ried out as Yes-No experiments rather than the three-way classification sug-
gested in the last section. Thus, the three-way classification {T,R, U} is coars-
ened into the three two-way classifications {T, T ′}, {R,R′} and {U,U ′}, where
T ′ means “not a target,” etc. There are three operations corresponding to
each of these decision dichotomies, one for each probe type, so the overall man-
ual consists of nine two-outcome experiments: {{TT , T
′
T }, {RT , R
′
T }, {UT , U
′
T},
{TR, T
′
R}, {RR, R
′
R}, {UR, U
′
R}, {TU , T
′
U}, {RU , R
′
U}, {UU , U
′
U}}. As was true
with the TRU trichotomies above, these operations are to be thought of as ide-
alized operations formed by compounding multiple probes in counterbalanced
order and collapsing by probe type. [It also turns out that subjects often get
confused if they are asked to change from one discrimination decision to another,
so in practice one group of subjects makes all of the T vs. T ′ classifications,
another group makes all the R vs. R′ decisions, and a third group makes all the
U vs. U ′ decisions.]
A weight function on this manual is characterized by its value on the first
outcome of each dichotomy (column 1 of Table 1). There are nine degrees
of freedom and Ω ≡ [0, 1]9, since there is no connection in the structure of
the manual between any two operations, hence no structural constraints on
the weight functions. (This is, of course, identical to the situation for the C2
Hilbert space manual, and the reason that Gleason’s Theorem does not work
there.) Similarly, the logic of this semi-classical manual is nine copies of the
Boolean algebra 2 pasted together horizontally.
According to the simplified version of Fuzzy Trace Theory presented here,
the conditional empirical frequencies in column 1 of Table 1 are determined by
the probabilities of four covert judgments:
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ιt = probability that an identity judgment is made for a target probe
σt = probability that a similarity judgment is made for a target probe given no
identity judgment
νr = probability that a nonidentity judgment is made for a related distractor
probe
σr = probability that a similarity judgment is made for a related distractor
probe given no nonidentity judgment
Column 2 of Table 1 gives the equations relating covert probabilities to overt
frequencies. The theoretically meaningful states (cf. “physical states”) are
ones that are generated by this theoretical model. Via these equations, the
nine-dimensional weight space for the manual is reduced to a four-dimensional
theoretical subspace. The theory is evaluated by collecting empirical weight
function data (via compounding and collapsing as above), then estimating the
best theoretical parameters to fit this data (iterative maximum likelihood es-
timation), and finally comparing the empirically observed frequencies with the
frequencies predicted by the equations. The predictions are generally within a
couple percentage points of the observed values [e.g., 19, Table 1].
Table 1: Probabilities assigned to different types of probes for each of the three
dichotomous discriminations. ωx(YZ) is the probability that a Z probe is called
a Y in the Y Y ′ discrimination under conditions x.
Theoretical
Probabilty
Probability in
Terms of the
Theoretical
Perfect Gist
and Perfect
Verbatim
Memory (ωp)
No Gist or
Verbatim
Memory (ω0)
Perfect Gist
Memory and
No Verbatim
Memory (ωg)
ω(TT ) = P (“T”|T ) ιt + (1− ιt)σt 1 0 1
ω(RT ) = P (“R”|T ) (1 − ιt)σt 0 0 1
ω(UT ) = P (“U”|T ) (1 − ιt)(1 − σt) 0 1 0
Sum 1 + (1 − ιt)σt 1 1 2
ω(TR) = P (“T”|R) (1 − νr)σr 0 0 1
ω(RR) = P (“R”|R) νr + (1− νr)σr 1 0 1
ω(UR) = P (“U”|R) (1 − νr)(1 − σr) 0 1 0
Sum 1 + (1− νr)σr 1 1 2
ω(TU ) = P (“T”|U) 0 0 0 0
ω(RU ) = P (“R”|U) 0 0 0 0
ω(UU ) = P (“U”|U) 1 1 1 1
Note: The Sum rows represents the total conditional probability for the operation {T,R, U}
when these outcomes are identified with the like-labeled outcomes in the dichotomies
{T, T ′}, {R,R′}, and {U,U ′}. The formulae in column 2 predict actual behavior; see text
for definitions of the parameters. The underlined terms represent the oddities of behavior
that cause the incompatibility of the operations; see text for details. In this setup the four the-
oretical parameters are estimated from the nine empirical probabilities. In real experiments,
subjects sometimes identify unrelated distractors as targets or related distractors, for no ob-
vious reason, so three additional “bias” parameters are needed, one for each discrimination,
resulting in seven parameters to be estimated from nine data points [cf. 16].
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If memory is perfect, all four theoretical parameters are one, i.e., (ιt, σt, νr,
σr) = (1, 1, 1, 1), and the weight function ωp is given by the third column in Table
1. If there is no memory for the studied words, all four theoretical parameters
are zero, i.e., (ιt, σt, νr, σr) = (0, 0, 0, 0), and the weight function ω0 is given
by the fourth column in Table 1. Since memory for verbatim details fades
more quickly than memory for the overall gist, after a time delay starting from
perfect memory, ιt and νr will be small, while σt and σr will remain relatively
large. The interesting phenomenon occurs as one approaches the state of zero
verbatim memory and perfect gist memory as happens when the gist is strongly
reinforced (by, say, presenting many exemplars of the given category) and there
is a long delay between study and test, allowing verbatim memory to fade. In
this case (ιt, σt, νr, σr) = (0, 1, 0, 1), so, according to the above equations—and
in agreement with empirical data—the weight function is given by ωg in the last
column in Table 1.
Behavior based on verbatim information is easy to predict and understand;
it is the way gist information is used that produces the incompatibilities in
the operations. Without verbatim information, it is impossible to discriminate
between related distractors and targets, so how do people respond when a sim-
ilarity judgment is made, but neither an identity judgment nor a nonidentity
judgment is made? It depends on the discrimination they are making. If asked
whether a probe is a target or not—the T vs. T ′ discrimination—people accept
the probe as a target. If asked whether a probe is a related distractor or not—the
R vs. R′ discrimination—people accept the probe as a related distractor. The
term (1 − ιt)σt therefore appears in both P (“T ”|T ) and P (“R”|T ). Similarly,
the term (1− νr)σr appears in both P (“T ”|R) and P (“R”|R). If the outcomes
in the dichotomous discriminations are identified with the corresponding out-
comes in the three-way TRU discrimination, then the conditional probabilities
for each probe type should add to one—but they do not, as indicated in the
Sum rows in Table 1. The sum exceeds one for targets by the doubled term
(1 − ιt)σt and for related distractors by the doubled term (1 − νr)σr . If either
verbatim information is perfect (so νt = νr = 1) or gist information is missing
(so σt = σr = 0), then both terms are 0 and the sum over TRU is 1, as expected.
In most real situations, the sum exceeds 1 and equals 2 in the extreme situation
represented by ωg.
Why might people would behave in this “illogical” way? It is easy to see how
evolution might have favored this behavior: Since much real-life memory occurs
after a delay when verbatim memory is weak yet gist is strong, we might live
our lives as “something like that happened last week.” Although most people
will back off to a position such as this when pressed, normally we easily accept
verbatim assertions as correct if the overall Gestalt matches the remembered
gist sufficiently well. Think back to earlier in this paper: Did I say “I majored
in math at college”?
The upshot of the behavior for the manual is (1) that the TRU triangle
cannot be added to the manual of dichotomies (if the outcomes are identi-
fied) without losing empirically observed weight functions, and (2) that coars-
ening the TRU trichotomy to {T, T ′} is not equivalent to coarsening TRU to
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{T, {R,U}}: When the outcomes R and U are “packed together” to form T ′,
they behave differently than the event {R,U}, wherein the subject makes the
TRU discrimination, but then R and U are lumped together for recording. A
similar phenomenon was noted by Tversky and Koehler [20, abstract] in people’s
judgments of frequency: “...judged probability increases by unpacking the focal
hypothesis and decreases by unpacking the alternative hypothesis.” The present
situation extends this finding beyond judgments of frequency to acceptance of
probes. Although packing R and U into T ′ has none of the algebraic flavor
of adding projections in a Hilbert space, it is in some sense a “coherent-like”
coarsening in that it behaves differently if we cannot know which of the packed
outcomes occurred, just as an interference pattern is observed in the two-slit
experiment if we cannot know which hole the electron went through (ontologic
uncertainty), but not if we could know but did not bother to look (epistemic
uncertainty).
4 Comparing Quantum Mechanics and Social
Science
4.1 The Manual
In the empirical sciences, a well founded experimental program ultimately is
concerned with some cohesive collection of physical operations—usually
complete or exhaustive in some sense. Randall and Foulis [11, p.170]
The manual of operations for spin-one particles is completely known in the
sense that the in-principle measurements are represented by the self-adjoint
operators on C3, and the in-principle manual of elementary operations con-
sists of all maximal sets of mutually orthogonal C3 projections. Indeed, every
experiment already has a name, to wit, the set of matrices representing the
projections in the operation. Real life measurements correspond to one of these
in-principle measurements in more or less known ways, and any in-principle
measurement can be realized by a suitable generalized Stern-Gerlach (GSG)
apparatus [5]. Although not all possible real-life measurements are known, any
such measurement is presumed to be equivalent to one of these GSG measures
via the correspondence with Hermitian operators. Similarly, the relationship
between any two in-principle measurements, and hence between any two real-
life measurements, is known, and the experiments are intricately intertwined.
Any two one-dimensional outcomes occur in overlapping operations: The out-
come orthogonal to both will be the overlap. (This overlap is what constrains
possible weight functions and makes Gleason’s Theorem work.) The manual
of in-principle operations—and up to GSG equivalence, the manual of real-life
operations—is exhaustive and coherent, as Randall and Foulis required. The
manual is parameterized by the field of the GSG apparatus.
Experiments in the memory manual can also be changed in “parametric”
ways paralleling rotations in space of the Stern-Gerlach apparatus: (1) The
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preparation of systems can be changed by using different numbers of exemplars
of each category; (2) The probes can be changed by varying their prototypicality
within the studied category; (3) the setting of the discrimination can be changed
by changing the delay between study and test. Moreover, (4) the discriminations
to be made can be changed by including more than one level of relatedness of
distractors. There is therefore one memory experiment for each preparation-
probe-setting-discrimination combination.
Although such combinations describe all experiments involving studying
words from categories and responding to recognition probes, unlike the spin-one
situation, what variations are possible is not fully knowable. We know some
variations, but some differences once considered irrelevant are later found to be
important, introducing new variations. If the experiments to be generalized to
are “memory for words from categories,” then the specific categories used should
not matter. Yet research has shown that concrete categories (e.g., fruits) and
abstract categories (e.g., personality traits) behave differently, so to handle all
memory experiments, the preparation needs an added dimension for abstract-
ness of the categories. Even beyond adding new dimensions there are problems
with identifying all possible preparations: What constitutes a word? Is a word
a particular participant has never heard, a word for purposes of testing that
participant’s memory? How long can a word list be? If it takes longer than a
human lifetime to listen to it, it is not a real experiment. Furthermore, German
word lists correspond to a different manual than English word lists. In sum, the
memory manual is unknown and additions and refinements to the manual are
continually being made. In particular, the manual considered by researchers at
a given moment in time is not exhaustive.
There are theoretical relationships between measurements and outcomes in
memory research just as there are in physics, but the experiments are not as
intricately intertwined, and relationships are generally ordinal rather than met-
ric, in contrast to the spin-one situations where rotating the GSG apparatus
by a certain amount has a precisely predicted effect. For example, experimen-
tally manipulating the number of exemplars per category—say 5 vs. 3—will
change the memory traces, strengthening the memory trace for the category as
a whole (hence increasing σt and σr) but having little effect on ιt for individual,
once-presented targets. The effect on σt and σr using 4 exemplars per category
would be between these two, but there is no prediction of exactly how much.
Hypotheses then typically have the form of “such-and- such manipulation causes
an increase in a certain variable.”
The relationship between real and idealized experiments in memory research
is also more complex than in physics. While no physical measurement is perfect,
the naive expectation is that given a theoretical measurement, with sufficient
care, a real-life measurement as close as desired to the theoretical measurement
can be devised [but compare 21]. In memory research, however, we wish to
measure memory for categorized lists in general, whereas all experiments use
specific categories that have properties not of theoretical interest. Any real
word-memory experiment is presumed to be a poor representative of the the-
oretical word-memory experiment of interest. In memory experimentation the
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implicit theoretical manual is the set of experiments the present experiments are
presumed/claimed/intended to generalize to, but the real manual uses a finite
number of specific words.
We address this problem by using multiple specific categories and averaging
to eliminate the extraneous and retain what results from common factors. A
study of memory for fruits or metals would be unconvincing as revealing gen-
eral memory phenomena, because the results might be influenced by something
specific about fruits or metals. It is only when we demonstrate a phenomenon
with multiple categories to show it is independent of the categories chosen, that
we have convincing evidence about “memory for categorized lists.” The reason-
ing here is similar to that of having multiple items on an IQ test: Answering
a particular item correctly is influenced by IQ as well as other experiences and
abilities; only when we average many of these items together do the other things
“average out” leaving a more pure assessment of the underlying IQ contribution.
4.2 Theory and States
In Operational Statistics, content-based theory is introduced in a couple differ-
ent ways. For both quantum physics and social science, formal and informal
theory goes into specifying the manual, particularly outcomes that occur in the
overlap between operations. An important example is whether T from TRU
should be identified with T in TT ′. Theory introduced by outcome identi-
fications suffices for spin-one experiments (but not spin-on-half), because the
structure of the manual determines exactly the weight functions that correspond
to physical states.
Since in memory research there is no the manual, its structure cannot de-
termine the states/weights (nor the logic), so theory to specify the meaningful
states must be added in some other way. Fuzzy Trace Theory per above, speci-
fies that the meaningful states arise from specific values of ιt, σt, νr, and σr via
the equations in column 2 of Table 1.
States in social science are always partial states: Given the complexity of
a human being, we never suspect that we have captured the full state, just as
we would not believe we have captured the full state of a feather in a room. In
the rarified realm of in-principle spin-one measurements, however, the state of
a specific particle (with phase information) is a pure state, and is assumed to
be the full and complete description of the particle. For memory experiments,
a full description is not even desirable: Since we want to study memory for
categorized lists (say), we do not want a state that specifies probabilities for
each word, but rather for targets vs. related distractors (say). In preparing
spin-one particles, each particle is in some pure state, with an ensemble of
particles forming a “mixed beam” of known distribution. In memory research,
not only are all beams mixed (different subjects are in different states), but
each individual subject is in a non-pure, partial state; we only have information
about the state with respect to certain specific experiences, allowing multitudes
of infinities of actual states, the specifics of which are unknowable and not of
interest.
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4.3 Coherent Coarsenings (Packing) and Outcome Inter-
ference
According to Feynman, the basic features of quantum mechanics are a
probabilistic theory outcomes that interfere with each other cannot be
distinguished without disturbing the system. Gudder [22, p. xi]
Memory experiments have the basic feature of quantum mechanics as ex-
pressed in the above quote. Memory theories are probabilistic theories. In
the memory example above, the outcomes R and U interfere with each other
when they are packed together as T ′ in the sense that the probability of T ′
is not generally equal to the probability of the event {R,U}, which represents
distinguishing between R and U experimentally.
The above quote continues with Feynman’s belief that “The main feature
of quantum mechanics is the way that probabilities are computed” [22, p. xi],
namely, taking the squared modulus of complex amplitudes: If the coarsening is
coherent (outcomes interfere), the amplitudes are added and then the squared
modulus is taken; if the coarsening is incoherent (no interference), the squared
modulus is taken before adding. Note that in computing these quantum prob-
abilities, there are exactly two versions: Add first or add second.
If one takes the basic features of “probabilistic theory with interfering out-
comes” to be the defining characteristic of nonclassical theories (or general
quantum structures), and “computing probabilities via amplitudes” as defin-
ing a specifically quantum theory, then memory theories are nonclassical but
not quantum. The packed coarsening of R and U into T ′ resembles the “coher-
ent” coarsening in quantum mechanics in that the probability is different from
the probability of the event {R,U}, but probabilities in this situation cannot
arise from amplitudes, even if one were to allow amplitudes to come from some
structure more general than C and have a more general mapping into proba-
bilities than squared modulus. To see this one need only note a sense in which
the memory example is even less classical than quantum mechanics: In compar-
ing the experiments {T, T ′} and {T, {R,U}}, not only are the probabilities of
T ′ and {R,U} different, but (consequently) the probability of T is different in
the two experiments, hence the probability of T cannot arise from a underly-
ing amplitude for T . If the spin-one experiment {P1, P2, P3} is coarsened into
{P1, P2⊕ P3} and {P1, {P2, P3}}, the probability of P1 remains unchanged.
Indeed, the probability of P2 ⊕ P3 is always the same as the probability of
{P2, P3}, because it is only in compound experiments that the difference be-
tween coherent and incoherent coarsenings shows itself [3].
The oddity in the memory experiments arises because of the identification
of the outcome T in TRU with the T in TT ′, but that is how people seem to
experience it. Yet empirically, packing the outcomes R and U changes the iden-
tity of both the packed T ′ and unpacked T alternatives. So, subjects experience
T as the same in TT ′ vs TRU , but assign it different probabilities! The oddity,
therefore, is in the way that human brains process information, rather than
(at least in any direct way) a macroscopic manifestation of some true quantum
14
phenomenon [cf. 23]. This also puts the locus of the oddity in a vastly more
complex system (the brain) that is likely to behave in more unruly ways than
spin-one particles.
That humans are making judgments also has ramifications for compound
experiments. It might be of interest, for example, to know what would happen
if the TT ′ experiment was followed by the TRU experiment. If the classification
is to be made about the same probe, the question becomes “You said HAMMER
was a target, now say whether it is a target, a related distractor or an unrelated
distractor.” The subject’s response is likely to be: “I just told you it is a target.”
But moreover, once the TRU discrimination is introduced, it is likely to unpack
R and U in the subject’s mind, changing subsequent judgments in the TT ′
discrimination. This is a further sense in which the TT ′ and TRU experiments
are incompatible. And TT ′ and RR′ may be incompatible for similar reasons:
They imply the “common refinement” TRU , thereby unpacking T ′ and R′ and
changing the original dichotomies. It is exactly this sense in which TRU is
not a common refinement of TT ′ and RR′. It is also interesting to note here
that unpacking might not be complete, allowing for intermediates between the
fully packed outcome T ′ and the fully unpacked event {R,U}, in contrast to
the dichotomous nature of coarsenings in quantum mechanics, i.e., whether you
take the modulus before or after adding the amplitudes.
Given the influences on human thinking, it may not be possible to do any
compound operations on the same probe, in stark contrast to physics where a
particle coming out of one Stern-Gerlach apparatus can be fed unproblematically
into a second. Indeed, the physical theory explaining one such experiment
generally allows us to predict the outcomes of compound experiments without
having a specific theory of them. This generalization in physics from simple to
compound operations is often based on the idea that measurements are of the
“first kind” [8]. Are memory measurements of the first kind? The “I just told
you....” response suggests they might be, but the resulting state is not pure as
it often is in physics, and if, as just discussed, compound operations in memory
research is problematic, how can we base the definition on empirical data?
4.4 Other Issues
There are several other issues worth considering briefly because they are often
raised as prototypic of quantum mechanics or social science. For example: Do
superpositions of states occur in social science? If a superposition is a linear
combinations of vectors in a complex state space, then this question is meaning-
less, since there are no complex state spaces for social science experiments. If
the question is about some generalization of the concept of superposition such
as the one proposed by Foulis, Piron and Randall [14, p.823], then certainly
these exist in social science; indeed ωp is a superposition in this sense of ω0 and
ωg, as is any weight that treats unrelated distractors as such, no matter what it
does for targets and related distractors. What is less clear is whether this tells
us anything useful.
Another difference between quantum mechanics and social science, related
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to complexity, is the question of isolated systems. In both quantum and clas-
sical mechanics, we perform Gedanken experiments on isolated systems and
fancy that we can create a system as nearly isolated as needed to check out the
theory. Social science deals with open, non-isolated systems. In the memory
experiments, for example, subjects come to the experimental sessions with a
lifetime of using the words that they will be tested on, and recent usage outside
the lab may parallel studying the word, so the outcome of the experiment is
influenced by extra-experimental factors which can never be eliminated. As was
the case with having to use specific words to test types of words, we dampen
extra-experimental influences by averaging over many subjects, no one of which
is an isolated system.
Both physics and social science use mathematical models—e.g., the Hilbert
space model or the Fuzzy Trace model—but the understanding of what the
models represent is different. In physics, a model is taken to represent reality
which actual experiments approximate, and although there are different Hilbert
space models for different systems, a given system has a specific mathematical
model. A physical state is a full description of the system at a given moment.
In social science, models are generally not representative of reality, but merely
descriptive: Things work out as if this were true. If a model is empirically sup-
ported, any theory must be consistent with this model to be credible. Fuzzy
Trace Theory does not specify a specific mathematical model for memory ex-
periments, but rather offers principles for how to construct models for specific
situations. The model presented above provides good predictions for the mem-
ory of words in categories, but if the situation is changed—e.g., if there were
two levels of relatedness of distractors—then Fuzzy Trace Theory would add
other parameters.
5 Summary and Agenda for Future Research
It is all too common these days for people to add “quantum” to a concept just
for the cachet of the word, for example “quantum healing” (healing that occurs
in tiny quanta?). That is not my intention here. I am not suggesting that social
science is quantum like. Rather, I am suggesting that quantum mechanics has
forced us to consider nonclassical logic and statistics, and that social science is
even more nonclassical than quantum mechanics.
Quantum mechanics and social science are similar in that they can both
be described by the Foulis-Randall Operational Statistics model, they are both
inherently probabilistic (for different reasons), they both deal with incompatible
experiments and they both exhibit outcome interference. And we have seen that
Nature does “take advantage of” the incompatible experiments by frequencies
incompatible with a common refinement.
Yet, quantum mechanics and social science are also fundamentally different
in that quantum mechanics provides a rich, complete mathematical description
of simple, isolated systems resulting in a small set of physical laws about a
manageable number of elementary particles and forces, whereas social science
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deals with sparse, partial descriptions of complex, open systems, resulting in
many approximate mini-theories about vast numbers of “objects,” for example,
the unknown and unknowable number of words in the memory experiments.
Fuzzy Trace Theory in particular has much in common with quantum the-
ory. Both began with facts that did not make sense given understandings at
the time (e.g., interference patterns in the two-slit experiment or acceptance
of related distractors as targets in memory research). Both proposed unob-
servable mathematical features (amplitudes in physics, probabilities of covert
judgments in memory) and equations that predict observed phenomena from
these unobservable features. In both domains, theories sink or swim based on
whether they predict observations across situations. Both predict that states
evolve over time, based on the unobserved features, and each in its characteris-
tic way: Quantum mechanics specifies a Hamiltonian describing metrically how
the state evolves; Fuzzy Trace Theory specifies ordinally how parameters change
with delay between study and test.
The similarities between quantum mechanical and social scientific theories
make it tempting to take mathematical structures derived to describe quan-
tum structures and apply them, or adapt them, to the social sciences. This
paper suggests, however, specific challenges to researchers who desire to build a
foundation—as Randall and Foulis (for example, [11], as quoted in section 4.1)
proposed to do—for all empirical science. I list some key challenges here:
1. We cannot assume that the manual of all relevant experiments is known,
and if the manual is not exhaustive, we cannot judge its coherence or
other similar properties. Without knowing the manual, we cannot know
the logic, so cannot ask about its properties, for example, is the logic an
orthomodular poset?
2. Theoretical considerations have to be brought in exogenously to the struc-
ture of the manual itself, for example, via the parameters and equations
derived from Fuzzy Trace Theory.
3. Outcome interference is less neat in social science than in quantum me-
chanics (for example, the graded packing of R and U described above),
occurs for different reasons (namely the way human brains work rather
than the nature of the universe directly), and may change frequencies of
non-coarsened outcomes.
4. The relation of real experiments to theoretical experiments is more com-
plex in social science, for example, having to test memory for categorized
words using specific words from specific categories. To approximate theo-
retical outcomes we must average over multiple subjects, study lists and
probes, none of which is in itself a particularly good example of the entity
of interest. (One may average in physics, too, but often over replications
of the same experiment.)
5. Theoretical relationships and empirical hypotheses are mostly ordinal, not
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metric. For example, using a longer study list might be predicted to change
overall memory performance, but not by a specific amount.
6. Mathematical models in social science are approximations to real data,
not truth. States are partial states on open systems.
The dismissive view of psychology as soft science leads to the spurious ques-
tion: Can psychology become like physics when it grows up? I hope that the
above thoughts can allow physicists to move beyond this stereotypic view of
social sciences as merely sloppy physics, and can offer those working in quan-
tum structures a vision of the territory that must be traversed before a true
description of empirical science is in hand. And that leaves the final question of
whether the new description can do real work in social science.
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